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3  The Political Economy Factors 
in Policymaking 
3.1  Introduction 
The  economic chaos  of  1958-65  left  such  a  deep  impression on  the 
institutional memory of  the new  Soeharto government that it has followed a 
“balanced”  budget rule since 1968. In reality, this rule amounts to refusing 
to finance the deficit through money creation and limiting the deficit to the 
availability  of  foreign  loans,  which  are  officially  described  as  foreign 
“revenue”.  Another consequence of  the chaos was the recognition that the 
exchange rate  is  an  extremely potent  policy  instrument which  can  effect 
large-scale, economy-wide resource reallocation and income redistribution. 
The  aim  of  this  chapter is  to  show how  the  institutional memory  has 
interacted  with  political  economy  factors  to  shape  Indonesian  economic 
management since 1965. In  short, this chapter attempts to illuminate how 
the dead hand of history sets the constraints within which the invisible hand 
of economics operates. An  emphasis on political factors should certainly be 
an important part of  any discussion about external debt management. In the 
final analysis, it  is these political considerations which determine whether a 
country will continue austerity measures in order to service its debts or will 
choose to repudiate its debts. ’ 
In the case of  Indonesia, an understanding of  the political alignment and 
economic  interests of  the different constituencies is necessary  in  order to 
make sense out of  the seemingly contradictory policies of  the  1980s. For 
example, in March 1983 when it was clear that oil prices would be unlikely 
to soon recover, the Indonesian currency was devalued by 38 percent against 
the dollar in order to promote nonoil exports. The devaluation was followed 
by  several  fundamental  reforms  with  the  stated  goal  of  liberalizing  the 
economy in order to improve resource allocation which would then lead to 
higher long-term growth. The financial sector was thoroughly deregulated; 
the  traditional  instruments of  monetary  control-interest  rate  ceilings and 
credit  rationing-were  abandoned  for  more  market-oriented  financial 
instruments.  The  tax  system  was  completely  restructured:  the  tax  code 
simplified, the tax base broadened, and marginal tax rates slashed. 
Economic  liberalization  was  nevertheless  not  the  overall  thrust  of 
Indonesian  economic policies.  At  the  time  that  the  liberalizing measures 
were introduced, an avalanche of  import restrictions was imposed. The new 
import restrictions generally took the form of  monopoly licensing. The right 
to import was granted either to an individual, to a small group of firms, or to 
import-competing  firms.  The  stated  aim  was  the  same  as  that  for  the 
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case  were  industrialization  and  the  development  of  sectoral  linkages. 
Furthermore,  since  many  of  the  monopoly  licenses  were  for  important 
industrial materials which were inputs to many export industries, these new 
trade policies ran counter to the purpose of the March 1983 devaluation. 
Given that all of the policies adopted in 1983 were drastic departures from 
past norms, one may be puzzled by  the absence of a clear direction in the 
new  economic strategy. We  attribute this  curious mix of  liberalizing steps 
and protectionist decrees to two factors: one, the existence of two groups of 
economic advisors who  represent  very  different  interests and  ideological 
perspectives;  and,  two,  the  delicate  role  of  the  president  in  Indonesian 
politics as the supreme arbiter of the distribution of economic benefik2 
3.2  The Dead Hand of History 
Indonesia is an authoritarian state which practices implicit corporati~m.~ 
President Soeharto has been in power since October 1965 and has not faced 
any serious challenges to his rule since the Malari riots of  January  1974. 
Parliament is dominated by  the government party,  GOLKAR, which is an 
umbrella organization of civil service unions, trade associations, and youth, 
veteran, and women’s groups. GOLKAR was created by Soeharto and hence 
it does not formulate the national agenda to be implemented by the president. 
The opposition parties are in such disarray that they actually receive annual 
government subsidies in order to maintain their operations. The plight of the 
opposition parties  is as much due  to government intimidation as  to  their 
record  for  ineffectiveness  and  squabbling  during  the  early  days  of  the 
Republic. 
Although Soeharto is a former army general and the army is the backbone 
of  GOLKAR, Indonesia is not a military state. The military does not have 
“important  centers of  power independent of  the central authority”  and the 
president does not engage in “a continuous process of bargaining with other 
officers”  (Sundhaussen 1978, 78). The army supports Soeharto but it, like 
GOLKAR, does not set the national agenda. 
We  pay  particular  attention  to  Soeharto’s  preferences  because  of  the 
unusual degree of  decision making concentrated in, and the broad executive 
powers granted to, this one individual. Since the authoritarian nature of the 
state renders the medium-run accountability of the president’s actions to be 
very  low,  and  there  are  substantial differences  in  interests and  ideology 
within the implicit coalition, Soeharto must be  considered an independent 
force rather than merely the compromise byproduct of competition among 
the elite groups. One way of describing the economic policymaking process 
is the following: The different lobbies and advisory groups propose policy 
initiatives, and the president adopts those which are either compatible with 
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patron. It is, therefore, only natural that we begin the task of explaining the 
choice of economic strategy in Indonesia by  studying the events and forces 
which shaped Soeharto’s views on economic management. 
Indonesia was in a state of total economic chaos when Soeharto assumed 
formal executive power in March 1966. The economy had grown unsteadily 
at an annual average rate of  1.8 percent between 1960 and  1965. Since the 
annual population growth rate was 2.5 percent, per capita income declined 
over this period. The inflation rate was also accelerating. It was 128 percent 
in  1963,  135  percent  in  1964,  and  595  percent  in  1965.  In  addition, 
Indonesia had defaulted on its external debts in  1965. 
The economic stagnation was inevitable given the many microeconomic 
distortions and the huge macroeconomic imbalances. An exchange rate that 
was overvalued for a prolonged period of time had caused the decline of the 
export  industries,  the  most  productive  sector  of  the  economy.  The 
import-competing industries, kept  alive  by  high  tariffs,  were  notoriously 
inefficient.  Extensive  price  controls  which  discouraged  production,  a 
complex tax system with high marginal rates, and a corrupt administrative 
structure also helped to cripple economic growth. 
The high inflation rate was the result of the monetization of the swingeing 
budget deficits and the government-ordered extension of  central bank credit 
to state enterprises and  to favored members of  the private sector. Central 
government expenditure was  103 percent larger than  its revenue in  1963, 
140 percent in  1964, and  163 percent  in  1965. The  rapid  expansion of 
money (Ml) in circulation reflected this fiscal mismanagement. The money 
stock increased 94 percent in 1963, 156 percent in 1964, and 283 percent in 
1965. The inflation rates in  1963 and  1965 were actually higher than the 
money growth rates, 129 percent and 595 percent, respectively, producing a 
situation  where  money  was  rapidly  losing  its  function as  a  medium  of 
e~change.~ 
On  3  October  1966  the  new  Indonesian  government  announced  a 
stabilization and rehabilitation program5 The central plank of the stabiliza- 
tion program was an unequivocal commitment to end the printing of  money 
to finance government budget deficits. The government pledged that it would 
adhere to a “balanced”  budget policy from 1967 on. In official Indonesian 
usage this meant that  government expenditure was  limited to  the  sum of 
domestic revenue and external loans. Since the Indonesian government was 
shut off from the external private credit market in  1966, such a budget rule 
was  effective in limiting government expenditure because of  the inelastic 
supply of  foreign concessionary loans. Furthermore, central bank credit to 
state and private enterprises was severely curtailed and  placed under strict 
supervision. 
The trend toward a demonetized economy was  immediately reversed- 
prices in 1967 rose only 112 percent when the currency stock went up by  132 59  IndonesidChapter 3 
percent. After two years of balanced budgets and continued credit restraint, 
the restoration of confidence in the rupiah was complete. In 1969 prices rose 
only 17 percent in  the face of a 61 percent increase in  the currency stock. 
Inflation reached the extraordinarily low rate of 4 percent in 1971 despite a 
nearly 30 percent rise  in  the amount of  currency in  circulation. Soeharto 
obviously understood his first lesson in macroeconomic management because 
the  balanced  budget  principle  has  never  been  compromised  during  his 
administration. To  Soeharto, a prudent fiscal policy is the prerequisite for 
preventing runaway inflation, and fiscal prudence is understood to mean a 
“balanced”  budget. 
The rehabilitation part of the October 1966 program was to allow market 
forces a greater (but by no means unrestricted) role in resource allocation. To 
reverse the trend toward subsistence fanning in the agricultural sector and, in 
particular, to improve the balance of payments, the government devalued the 
rupiah from 10 rupiahs/dollar to 100 rupiahs/dollar.6 Price controls on many 
commodities were removed to encourage their production. The government 
subsequently  showed  no  reluctance  to  allow  the  rupiah  to  depreciate 
according to market conditions. The rupiah stood at 326 to the dollar at the 
end of  1968. 
Real nonoil exports (measured in foreign purchasing power) increased by 
12 percent between 1965 and 1968.7 This is an underestimate because there 
was  a large upsurge in  smuggling to evade unauthorized taxes  levied by 
corrupt officials who attempted to scoop some of the gains of the devaluation 
for themselves (see Penny  and Thalib  1967). This export growth is  still 
impressive, however,  because  this  was  a  period  of  slow  growth  in  the 
industrialized  economies.*  The  surge  in  agricultural exports  came  from 
increased production by  the small holders rather than by  the estates. The 
production of  farm nonfood crops increased by  19 percent compared to a 7 
percent  increase  in  estate  output  (World  Bank  1975,  table  2.2).  The 
rehabilitation program really took effect in  1968 when real GDP increased 
by  an unprecedented 11 percent. There was an annual average growth rate of 
over 8 percent from 1969 until the 1973 OPEC price increase. 
The distributional aspects of the devaluation are clear. Since the prices of 
commodities are set in dollars, a devaluation of the rupiah translated directly 
into increased income for the small agricultural producers. It would belittle 
Soeharto’s ability if  we were to believe that he was not aware of  either the 
political economy of  the  1966 devaluation or its effectiveness as a policy 
instrument. Since then, devaluation has been a frequently used instrument; 
the  rupiah  was  devalued  in  1978  even  when  there  was  no  balance- 
of-payments crisis  ! Competitive exchange rate management alongside the 
balanced budget are the two constants in Soeharto’s economic policymaking, 
and  they  directly result from the  memory  of  the  economic chaos of  the 
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3.3  Agrarian Radicalism, Separatism, and the Peasant Background 
of Soeharto 
It  would  be  helpful  at  this  point  to  use  the  issue  of  exchange  rate 
management to lay out the political  environment within which decisions are 
made  about the  goals  of  economic  policies  and  the  choice  of  instruments 
with  which  to  implement  them.  The considerations  that  render  Soeharto 
immune to a commitment to a strong (read “overvalued”)  currency are the 
same ones that dictate budgetary choices during times when total spending 
has to be restrained  to match lower revenue  growth.  Soeharto’s attitude to 
the  exchange  rate  after  observing  the  distributional  impact  of  the  1966 
devaluation  is  rooted  in  two  political  concerns  and  a  strong  personal 
commitment. 
The  first  political  concern  is  to  avoid  conditions  favorable  to  the 
resuscitation  of the PKI. In  1965 Indonesia had  “the  strongest communist 
party outside the communist bloc,  with a membership of over three million 
and affiliated mass organizations of  farmers,  workers,  women, and students 
that claimed over 20 million followers”  (Dake 1973, 1-2).  The fact that its 
members were largely  landless peasants in  Central and East  Java indicates 
that any prolonged impoverishment of the rural heartland  could lead to the 
resurgence  of  the  PKI.  Soeharto is  personally  opposed  to  the  communist 
ideology,  and  he  has  had  two bloody  encounters  with  the  PKI. The first 
run-in  was  the  internecine  Madiun  Affair  in  1948 when  the  PKI  tried  to 
hijack the leadership of the independence movement. The second showdown 
was the  1965-66  aftermath of the  abortive communist  coup of  September 
30.9  The official casualty figure for the latter event is half a million, though 
unofficial reports of  the period  put it  at one million. The political lesson is 
clear: the spectre of communism can be exorcised only by  improvements in 
the lives of the rural population. 
Soeharto’s  second political concern  is the diversity  of the ethnic groups 
which live in the  13,000 islands which make up Indonesia-“There  are over 
three hundred different ethnic groups in Indonesia, each with its own cultural 
identity, and more than two hundred and fifty distinct languages are spoken 
in the  archipelago.  Religious beliefs,  too, are varied”  (Geertz  1963, 24). 
This  diversity  resulted  in  numerous  secession  attempts  in  the  1950s. 
Soeharto was  personally  involved  in  squashing  a rebellion  in  Sulawesi in 
1950. The sense of alienation in the Outer Islands has not been helped by the 
fact that  the  inner circles  of  the  government  have  been  dominated  by  the 
Javanese  since  independence  in  1949.  It  has,  hence,  been  necessary  to 
assuage feelings of discrimination among the non-Javanese by proffering to 
them tangible economic benefits.  The government has had to do more than 
raise living standards as it did in rural Java, it has also had to make it clear 
that  inter-island  (regional)  equity  is  a  primary  goal  of  the  Soeharto 
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been  a  high  priority,  reinforcing  Soeharto’s  readiness  to  devalue  the 
currency.  Most  of  the  import-substitution industries,  whose  products  are 
practically nontradables because of cost inefficiency, are located in Java, and 
a  devaluation  always  turns  the  regional  terms  of  trade  in  favor  of  the 
agricultural-commodity-exporting Outer Islands. 
On  the  personal  level,  Soeharto  has  never  downplayed  his  peasant 
origin.”  From  the  earliest  days  of  his  presidency,  he  has  consistently 
emphasized the need to improve the living standard in rural areas. Even if 
one  were  to dismiss  Soeharto’s  avowed  commitment to  alleviating rural 
poverty  as  political  opportunism,  the  critic  must  concede  that  all  this 
symbolism  testifies  to  the  importance  which  Soeharto  places  on  rural 
development.”  It  may  have  been  more  than  “mere”  symbolism that  the 
agricultural sector was singled out for attention in the first development plan, 
Repelita  1. This  agricultural emphasis has  been  continued  in  subsequent 
development plans. 
It is the combination of  the three factors-oncem  about the traditional 
peasant  base  of  PKI,  experience  with  secessionist  movements,  and  a 
personal commitment to rural development-that  explains a great deal of the 
observed allocation of government expenditure in particular, and the conduct 
of economic management in general. The first and third concerns imply the 
need to improve the absolute level of  the standard of  living in rural areas, 
while the second concern implies the need to improve (or bring to par) the 
relative standard of  living in the Outer Islands. Together these three factors 
focus attention on development of the agricultural sector, that is, rice in Java 
and  agricultural commodities in the Outer Islands. l2 The general INPRES 
programs (development funds funneled directly at the president’s discretion 
through decrees, Znstruksi Presiden,  to the local level), fertilizer subsidies, 
irrigation projects, and maintenance of  a competitive exchange rate are the 
most explicit manifestations of  the high priority placed on developing the 
agricultural sector. 
3.4  Economic Nationalism, Political Patronage, Priburni-ism, and the 
Military Background of  Soeharto 
Attention  to  its  agricultural  sector  does  not  mean  a  strong  overall 
agricultural bias in Indonesian economic policies. Rather, the bias is toward 
the industrial sector. There is widespread popular sentiment for, significant 
intellectual support of, and powerful special interests clamoring for the rapid 
development of a large and diversified industrial base. The president himself 
is  sympathetic  to  this  view  because  of  his  experience  in  the  war  for 
independence. As we explained in chapter 1,  Dutch economic policies were 
seen as designed to impose a plantation economy on Indonesia to serve the 
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Indonesia of  its wealth through profit repatriation. In reaction, the generation 
of 1945 regards industrialization as the key to economic prosperity because 
technological advancements were,  supposedly, less likely to occur in  the 
agricultural sector. They  see  the  repatriation  of  profits to  Holland  as an 
additional reason for the absence of  investment in manufacturing. 
So  it  is  understandable  that  economic  nationalism  in  postcolonial 
Indonesia took the form of  state support for industrialization programs and 
intolerance for foreign ownership of capital (except in extractive industries in 
the Outer Islands where the capital requirements were immense). The policy 
translations of  economic nationalism are high trade barriers to induce the 
development of  a manufacturing sector and foreign investment laws (which 
still  are)  stricter  than  those  of  neighboring  countries.  It  is  Soeharto's 
economic  nationalism  which  explains  the  vacillating  attitude  toward 
laissez-faire. The  simultaneous introduction  in  1983  of  liberalizing mea- 
sures, such as financial deregulation, together with interventionist measures, 
such as additional nontariff barriers, illustrates this ambiguity. 
Setting up  inefficient industries behind trade barriers may  reflect more 
than the fact that the army is the bastion of  economic nationalism or the 
belief that industrial development is the long-run solution to rural poverty. 
An  institutional legacy  from the  past  may  have  been  equally important. 
During  the  war  for  independence,  the  various  army  units  were  self- 
supporting by  circumstances, as there was  no functioning central govern- 
ment to make budget allocations. In the Soekarno years, army generals were 
expected to continue supporting their troops by  raising outside revenue to 
supplement their budget allocations. Joint business ventures involving senior 
army generals and the private sector were common. This practice has been 
expanded under  the  Soeharto regime,  and  the  use  of  army personnel  in 
business management has been justified by the doctrine of  dwifungsi.'3  The 
imposition of  trade barriers to give a monopoly position to manufacturing 
enterprises with army connections thus serves the dual purpose of catering to 
the  army's  economic  nationalism  and  providing  additional  funds  to  the 
armed  forces.14 The  second  purpose  is  an  important reason  Indonesian 
manufacturing industries are  oriented toward  internal rather than external 
markets.  Competition  in  external  markets  may  make  production  more 
efficient, but it also makes funding for the army more uncertain. This also 
helps to explain why quotas rather than tariffs are the favored form of import 
restriction.15 The granting of  quota rights is a  faster way  of  transferring 
funds to selected groups like the army, bypassing the laborious budgetary 
process.  The  result  is  that  the  budget  understates  the  revenue  and 
expenditure of the public sector. 
The widespread use of  monopoly import licensing since  1982 serves in 
most cases the same transfer-of-funds function as quotas. Since the license 
holders are usually family members of  government officials and political 
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rent-seeking  purposes  than  for  infant  industry  reasons.  l6  What  is  being 
revealed is the political patronage side and not the economic nationalist side 
of the Indonesian state. 
It has been  argued that this privatization of  public funds was actually a 
form  of  privatization  of  public  works  rather  than  the  fruits  of  political 
patronage. According to Bustanil Arifin, the minister of  cooperatives, the 
profits of the monopoly import licensing system are “being used to develop 
small  industries,  build  mosques  and  churches  and  run  public  health 
 program^."'^ The point is that given the considerable overlap of personnel in 
the public and private sectors (a practice sanctioned by dwifungsi), the line 
between these two sectors is blurred in  Indonesia. Since private firms are 
expected to  contribute for nonbudgeted public projects, it is perhaps not 
surprising that  when  the  biggest  cement  company,  Indocement, ran  into 
financial difficulties in July 1985, the government reciprocated by  spending 
over U.S.  $325 million to bail it out. 
The ways in  which  Soeharto’s background has influenced his style of 
economic management have  presented occasional problems for the budget. 
Perhaps, being a military man, it is natural that Soeharto shows impatience 
at  the  bureaucratic  implementation  of  government  programs.  What  is 
surprising is that instead of trying to streamline the bureaucracy, he regards 
its  inefficiency as endemic. Two events reveal  this  attitude very  clearly. 
Through INPRES since 1969, a sizable amount of development spending is 
directly channelled to  the  village  and  county levels,  bypassing the  usual 
disbursement mechanism. More  recently,  in  1985,  the  entire  Indonesian 
customs  service,  well  known  for  its  corruption and  delay,  was  put  on 
indefinite paid leave. A private Swiss firm (SociCtC GCnCrale de Surveillance 
S.A. of Geneva) was hired in  its place to clear the goods at their foreign 
ports of departure. In the eighteen years of his rule, Soeharto had plenty of 
time to revamp the customs service but he chose not to. And  when he did 
respond  to  its  inefficiency,  the  action  reflected  his  pessimism  about 
bureaucratic reform. 
While  Soeharto  highly  valued  the  advice  of  his  capable  economic 
technocrats, he  saw  their penchant  for  detailed financial assessment  and 
accountability as a drag on the pace of  development. Soeharto’s appoint- 
ments  of,  first,  General  Ibnu  Sutowo,  and  then  Technology  Minister 
Habibie, as the czars of national industrialization, arise from his perception 
that the problems of  a desperately poor country like Indonesia are obvious 
and what is needed are quick, decisive actions initiated and enforced by  a 
capable and dedicated individual. Quick actions necessarily dictate that the 
individual be unconstrained by  the usual bureaucratic checks which, after 
all, are meant only for men of  lesser talent and dedication. 
Soeharto’s practice of allowing the “dynamiser”  a free rein follows from 
his own experiences as the Central Java regional commander in the 1950s. 
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revenue to supplement the budget allocation in order to maintain the army 
units, the force that was preventing the disintegration of the new country into 
regional  republics.  Soeharto  met  this  challenge  with  a  series  of  very 
successful business  ventures.  In  addition  to  the  usual  transportation  and 
trading activities,  Soeharto’s military  command was the only  one with  a 
Development Contribution Fund  financed by  levies on  the  local  business 
community. 
Soeharto’s style of  granting broad discretionary powers to his industrial- 
ization czars resulted in the Pertamina crisis in February 1975. General Ibnu 
Sutowo, who  in  1966 became head  of  the  state oil  company,  Pertamina, 
expanded its nonoil investments tremendously. To  finance this proliferation 
of  activities, Pertamina borrowed heavily in the international credit market. 
A  significant  portion  of  Pertamina’s  external  debt  was  in  short-term 
borrowing because the technocrats resented the evolution of  Pertamina into 
an  independent development agency  and had,  with  the  help of  major aid 
donors,  pressured  Soeharto  to  restrict  Pertamina’s  borrowing  in  the 
medium-term credit market. 
It  was  this  borrowing  in  the  short-term  market  which  precipitated the 
Pertamina crisis. In 1973 and 1974 Pertamina found itself paying higher and 
higher interest payments on  the debt it  was continually rolling over. (The 
interest rate  rose  because the central banks in  the industrialized countries 
were  stomping on  their  monetary  brakes  in  order  to  dampen  aggregate 
demand  to  offset  the  supply-side  inflation  caused  by  the  OPEC-1  price 
increases  .)  The  increased  debt-service  burden  proved  too  much  for 
Pertamina. In  February  1975 it  defaulted on  a short-term loan,  and Bank 
Indonesia  had  to  take  over  Pertamina’s  debt.  Bank  Indonesia’s  foreign 
exchange reserves fell from $1.6 billion in January  1975 to $0.5 billion in 
September  1975, while at  the  same time  its  foreign  liabilities rose  from 
(nearly)  zero  to  $0.8  billion,  a  reflection  of  the  tremendous  external 
borrowing  required  to  meet  Pertamina’s  obligations  during  those  seven 
months.”  The  big  diversion  of  resources  led  to  the  scaling  back  of 
development expenditure in 1976/77 and 1977/78. 
It  would  be  wrong  to  attribute  the  fiscal  problems  arising  from  the 
Pertamina affair entirely to Soeharto’s predilection for getting things done 
quickly.  Special  interests  and  ideology  were  also  important  in  shaping 
events. The huge revenue generated by  rapid development of  the petroleum 
sector was very important to the Soeharto government in the early days of its 
administration because it obviated the unpopular steps of raising taxes to pay 
for routine government expenditures.  l9 Since the Ministry of Finance had no 
knowledge of  the  amount  of  oil  taxes  and  royalties  that  Pertamina  had 
collected on the Ministry’s behalf, Pertamina retained part of the revenue for 
extrabudgetary activities. These activities helped to consolidate Soeharto’s 
power base by  channelling resources to key constituents to meet what Karl 
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the armed forces, which had their official budget capped in order to convince 
external aid  donors of  the commitment by  the  Indonesian government to 
development,  were  a  big  recipient  of  extrabudgetary  allowances  from 
Pertamina. Given these extra functions,  it  was  no  surprise therefore that 
Sutowo adopted a management style which  “ensured that few people apart 
from himself even had a rough overall picture of  the finances of  operations 
of  the company”  (McCawley 1978, 5). Nothing illustrated this attempt at 
obfuscation  better  than  the  fact  that  Pertamina  had  six  uncoordinated 
accounting departments.*’ 
Ideology also plays an important role in  explaining the Pertamina affair 
because there was a sizable group of  intellectuals who concluded that  the 
establishment of more quasi-state conglomerates a la Pertamina was essential 
for political  stability. An  underlying resentment among  many  indigenous 
Indonesians  (pribumis) was  that  the  Chinese Indonesians (peranakan  and 
totok) wielded economic power disproportionate to their 3 percent share of 
the population. It was widely felt that this state of affairs originated from the 
victimization of  the pribumis by  Dutch colonial policies.21 This resentment 
against the Chinese led to occasional mob destruction of Chinese property. 
These intellectuals were  pessimistic about the ability of  laissez-faire to 
change  this  inequality  drastically  and  quickly  enough  to  be  politically 
acceptable. They proposed that Chinese domination of  business be reduced 
by  launching large, state-sponsored enterprises, each headed by  one of  the 
small number of  talented pribumi  entrepreneurs in existence. By regarding 
these Indonesian zaibatsu as holding their capital in trust for the pribumis, 
the  share  of  indigenous  ownership  of  capital  would  be  considerably 
increased  very  rapidly.22 This method  of  defusing racial tension  received 
enthusiastic support from the economic nationalists within the army, the key 
constituency in Soeharto’s regime, making it easier for Soeharto to follow 
his preference for quick action. 
3.5  The Embodiment of the Different Concerns at the 
Policymaking Level 
The primary reason Indonesia sometimes pursues a contradictory mix of 
liberalizing  and  protectionist  policies  is  because  of  these  ideological, 
pecuniary, and personal elements working themselves through two groups of 
contending  presidential  economic  adivsors,  popularly  referred  to  as  the 
technocrats and the  technician^.^^ The technocrats are mostly economists of 
neoclassical  persuasion  who  work  at  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and  the 
National Planning Body (BAPPENAS). Their acceptance of the comparative 
advantage principle  leads  them  to  emphasize  the  development of  nonoil 
export industries, particularly agricultural commodities and labor-intensive 
manufactured goods. This has meant a favorable treatment of the agricultural 
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percent in  1980. Exchange rate  devaluations,  rather  than  the  removal  of 
trade restrictions on imported inputs, are used to promote exports because 
the technocrats control the ministries that oversee macroeconomic policies 
but  not  the  Ministry  of  Trade  and  the  Ministry  of  Industry  which  have 
authority over trade restrictions. 
The technocrats do not have much of  a domestic constituency outside of 
the  universities.  Consistently strong  sources of  support  for  their market- 
oriented  policies  are  the  foreign  aid  donors,  the  World  Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, and IGGI.24  This foreign backing helped in the 
early years to  establish the role and power of  the technocrats because of 
Indonesia’s dependency at that time on foreign concessionary  This 
aspect was very well illustrated by  the strategy the technocrats adopted to 
rein  in Pertamina when it  was intruding upon the economic policymaking 
turf.26  In  March  1972 the minister of  finance chose to enter into another 
standby agreement with the IMF, even though in the agreement document 
the IMF had concluded that: 
[the] proposed fiscal and credit policies, the recent depreciation in the 
effective exchange rate of the rupiah, the expected substantial increase in 
net receipts from crude oil exports should make possible the achievement 
[of the Indonesian goals which were] to achieve a higher rate of economic 
growth  in  conditions  of  relative  price  stability,  and  to  increase  net 
international reserves. (emphasis added) 
The  result  of  this  extreme  aversion  of  the  Ministry of  Finance to  the 
possibility of a balance-of-payments crisis led to the IMF setting a ceiling on 
medium-term external borrowing of $145 million for 1972/73 as part of the 
standby agreement. A decree was issued in October 1972 requiring all state 
bodies  to  seek approval from the  Ministry of  Finance before  contracting 
medium-term foreign loans. When Pertamina ignored this decree, the United 
States  (the  biggest  donor)  suspended  its  aid.  Pertamina  then  started 
borrowing in the short-term market to finance its long-term investments. As 
noted earlier, this switch led to the 1975 Pertamina debt crisis, after which 
the firm was taken over by army personnel sympathetic to the technocrats. 
Despite the big decline in the importance of foreign aid after the oil boom, 
the technocrats have maintained their influence on economic policies because 
of  their  proven  competence.  They  designed  and  implemented  the  1966 
stabilization program, restructured Pertamina’s debts, and introduced a new 
professionalism into economic management. This explains why the president 
remains their patron. 
The second group of economic advisors, the technicians, is an amorphous 
collection of technicians-turned-managers, military advisors, and economists 
with structuralist  inclination^.^^ The technicians are united by their common 
belief  in the general validity of  the infant industry argument and by  their 
common rejection of  foreign capital ownership. They see state enterprises 67  IndonesidChapter  4 
like  Pertamina  (until  its  downfall)  as  vehicles  to  achieve  these  two 
objectives.’’  This  position  allies  the  technicians  with  members  of  the 
intelligentsia who see state enterprises as the way to counterbalance Chinese 
domination of the corporate sector. 
The technicians’ control of  the Ministry of  Trade has allowed them to 
encourage domestic production of manufactured goods, including airplanes. 
Given  the  strong  sense  of  economic  nationalism  in  Indonesia  and  the 
widespread belief  that  only  industrialization (regardless of  whether  it  is 
import-competing or export-oriented) holds the key to a higher standard of 
living, the technicians enjoy popular support among the Indonesian elite. 
Furthermore, their import-substitution industrialization has won  them the 
support of the army, the most powerful constituency in the country. Thanks 
to  the  dwifungsi  doctrine,  the  expansion  of  state  enterprises translates 
directly into more managerial positions for senior military personnel. It must 
be noted that since most of  the import-competing industries were set up in 
urban Java, the higher prices of manufactured goods represented an implicit 
tax on residents of the rural sector and the Outer Islands. 
In looking at the political setting within which policies are chosen, we 
have  identified  an  important  political  coalition  of  technocrats,  Outer 
Islanders, and rural residents which favors a political package emphasizing 
the maintenance of  a competitive exchange rate. The fact that there exists a 
strong institutional memory about the economically destructive effects of an 
overvalued exchange rate means that the government is naturally disposed to 
the arguments for a competitive exchange rate.  Since a debt crisis occurs 
when a government runs out of  foreign reserves, this emphasis on avoiding 
prolonged exchange rate  overvaluation reduces  the  probability  of  a  debt 
crisis by keeping the (foreign exchange earning) nonoil export sector healthy 
and  capital  flight low.  We  shall show  in  subsequent chapters how  these 
political  and  economic  factors  have  influenced  the  setting of  economic 
policies and, hence, the performance of the economy. 
4  The Fiscal System 
4.1  Introduction 
The  two  arguments  we  are  developing  in  this  monograph  are  that 
appropriate exchange rate management was fundamental to why a debt crisis 
did not appear during 1982-84  and that the exchange rate policy was heavily 
influenced by  political considerations. The aim of  this chapter is to test the 